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International Conference “Medieval and Renaissance Sciences in Context: Challenges to Aristotelian Methods”
juin 13 @ 9h00 - juin 14 @ 17h00
Thursday 13th June 2024 – Room 127 (1st floor, Olympe de Gouges building)
Session 1
Chair: Pierre-Marie Morel (Université Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne – SPHERE)
| 9.00 | Welcoming participants |
| 9.15-10.00 | Cristina Cerami (CNRS – SPHERE): Averroes and Galen on biological luxury |
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10.00-10.30
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Coffee break |
| 10.30-11.15 | Seyed Mousavian (Loyola University of Chicago): Avicenna, Meaning, and Causation |
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11.15-12.00
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Sylvain Roudaut (KULeuven): From the ʿilm al-athqāl to the scientia de ponderibus: The challenge of integrating statics in the ‘Aristotelian’ tradition |
| 12.00-14.00 | Lunch buffet |
Session 2
Chair: Silvia di Donato (SPHERE, CNRS)
| 14.00-14.45 | Charles Manekin (University of Maryland): When an Aristotelian Deviates from Aristotle: Levi Gersonides on Modality, Timeless Truth, and Existence |
| 14.45-15.15 | Coffee break |
| 15.15-16.00 | Yehuda Halper (Bar-Ilan University): Science in Alphabetical Order? Samuel Ibn Tibbon’sExplanation of Foreign Terms, Al-Farabi’s Iḥṣā al-‘ulūm, and the Importance of Astronomy in 13th c. Aristotelian Science |
| 16.00-16.45 | Dominic Dold (University of Notre Dame) : Albert the Great on Definitions in Demonstrations |
| 19.30 | Conference dinner |
Friday 14th June – Room 105 (1st floor, Olympe de Gouges building)
Session 3
Chair: Christophe Grellard (EPHE)
| 10.00-10.45 | Vincenzo de Risi (CNRS – SPHERE): The Ground of Axioms: Principles of Demonstration in the Thirteenth Century |
| 10.45-11.15 | Coffee break |
| 11.15-12.00 | Nicola Polloni (Università degli Studi di Messina): Epistemic Trust, Testimony, and Bogus Evidence: The Strange Case of Roger Bacon |
| 12.00-14.00 | Lunch buffet |
Session 4
Chair: Sophie Serra (University of Gothenburg – SPHERE)
| 14.00-14.45 | Yael Kedar (Tel Hai College): Roger Bacon’s mathematical epistemology: the “geometrical arguments” against the unity of matter |
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14.45-15.15
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Coffee break |
| 15.15-16.00 | H Darrel Rutkin (CAS-e, FAU, Erlangen-Nuremberg): Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s (1463-94) Turn to Aristotle: Reforming Celestial Influences and the Rejection of Astrology |
| 16.00-16.45 | Craig Martin (Università Ca Foscari – Venezia): Experience and Habitus in Giambattista Da Monte’s Commentary on the Hippocratic Epidemics I |
Co-organised by Aurélien Robert & Ana María Mora-Márquez
Université Paris Cité, Université Paris 1, SPHERE (CNRS), University of Gothenburg, Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation
ABSTRACTS:
Charles Manekin
When an Aristotelian Deviates from Aristotle: Levi Gersonides on Modality, Timeless Truth, and Existence
The Occitane Jewish philosopher Levi Gersonides (1288-1344) has been characterized as a critic of Aristotle from within the Aristotelian camp. In my talk I will consider some of his deviations from Aristotelianism, including the following claims: truth is the conformity, or in a sense identity, of our concepts with the plan that is the mind of the Active Intellect; b) scientific knowledge is possible not only of essential properties but also of accidental properties; c) human choice creates a sphere of indeterminacy within the plan of existents; d) the world is created at an instant through Divine will. I will argue that while Gersonides stretches some traditional Aristotelian concepts and doctrines beyond recognition, his frame of reference remains Aristotle, or at least, Aristotle as interpreted and presented by Averroes, with which he was familiar in Hebrew translation
Yehuda Halper
TBA
Seyed N. Mousavian
Avicenna, Meaning, and Causation
Some “Platonists” argue that the objects of scientific knowledge are Platonic forms, and our knowledge of such form comes through recollection. In contrast, some “Aristotelians” argue that the objects of scientific knowledge are Aristotelian essences and knowledge of such essences comes through abstraction from individuals via their “likenesses.” Avicenna rejects both views. He argues that Platonic forms, as independent substances, do not exist and knowledge of such forms cannot be through recollection because the human soul does not preexist the human body. Furthermore, Avicenna rejects the notion of “likeness” both in his theory of vision and that of intellection. Avicenna’s epistemology has led to controversy among contemporary and classic interpreters of Avicenna. In this paper, after introducing the problem and critically reviewing the literature, I will explore a new interpretation, called “Avicennan Abstraction,” according to which a blueprint of an intelligible form is genuinely abstracted from some imaginable forms and, as a result, the intelligible form is concurrentlyemanated upon the rational soul. Thus, Avicenna’s epistemology is explained in light of his semantics of meaning and metaphysics of accidental causation.
Cristina Cerami
Averroes and Galen on biological luxury
If one considers the entire philosophical and medical corpus of Averroes, Galen is second only to Avicenna in the number and severity of his criticisms. Because of his logical and epistemological errors, as well as his inability to understand the relevance of Aristotelian hylomorphism, Galen seems to embody for Averroes the very example of the physician who falsely claims to be able to override the work of the philosopher. In some earlier works I have shown that Averroes’ critical attitude did not lead him to reject Galen’s doctrine in its entirety. On the contrary, from the doctrine of the elements to the principles of the chemistry of life, Averroes adopted certain crucial theses from Galen’s theory of the sensible, as set out in his treatises on human nature, and integrated them into Aristotelian ontology. Contrary to one interpretation of this debate, I have argued that Averroes not only adopts Galen’s anatomical discoveries and terminology, but also modifies Aristotle’s ontology of the sensible in the light of Galen’s doctrine. In a nutshell, I argued that Averroes did not limit himself to “Aristotelizing” Galen, but to “Galenising” Aristotle. In my presentation I’d like to show that Averroes makes a similar effort when he has to account for the major anatomical discoveries of Galen and, more generally, of post-Aristotelian Greco-Arab medicine.
Vicenzo de Risi
The Ground of Axioms: Principles of Demonstration in the Thirteenth CenturyIn the thirteenth century there arose a new theory of the justification of the truth of the principles of demonstration, which held that axioms are derivable from the definitions of the terms employed. The theory has multiple sources, and in the course of the talk I will show how it arose from the encounter of Grosseteste’s illumination theory, attempts to combat Averroism, Arabic mathematical sources, and a crucial mistranslation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. The talk will consider the major philosophical consequences of this non-Aristotelian theory, and some of its long legacy over the following centuries.
The Ground of Axioms: Principles of Demonstration in the Thirteenth CenturyIn the thirteenth century there arose a new theory of the justification of the truth of the principles of demonstration, which held that axioms are derivable from the definitions of the terms employed. The theory has multiple sources, and in the course of the talk I will show how it arose from the encounter of Grosseteste’s illumination theory, attempts to combat Averroism, Arabic mathematical sources, and a crucial mistranslation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. The talk will consider the major philosophical consequences of this non-Aristotelian theory, and some of its long legacy over the following centuries.
Dominic Dold
Albert the Great on Definitions in Demonstrations
One of the better-known debates in medieval Latin philosophy of science is the controversy over the middle term in a demonstration of the strongest type (demonstratio potissima), in which an attribute P is demonstrated of a subject S through a middle term M. Philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus famously argued that in such a demonstration, M should be the definition of S. Other 13th-century thinkers, such as Albert the Great (but also Robert Kilwardby and Giles of Rome), claimed that M must be the definition of P instead. Apart from being one of the earlier contributions to the Latin debate, Albert’s position is particularly significant because it exerted significant influence on Renaissance discussions about the scientific status of mathematics. It is, therefore, worth revisiting Albert’s account on its own terms. In particular, one ought not take for granting that the problem of the later debate was already well posed for Albert and that it was posed in the same manner. What indeed makes a demonstration to be ‘of the strongest type’? What is admissible as S, what as P? Which types of definitions are being considered for either S or P? Only upon answering these questions is it possible meaningfully to ask whether M is the definition of S or Pin a demonstration of the strongest type. I address these questions by focussing on Albert’s motivations behind his position, in particular on how the issue sits within his commentary on the Posterior Analytics as well as his natural philosophy (the principal domain for demonstrations of the strongest type for Albert). I show that the Albertinian view is well-motivated, and argue that Albert’s account of the middle term fits neatly into overarching threads of his theory and methodology of science.
Yael Kedar
Roger Bacon’s mathematical epistemology: the “geometrical arguments” against the unity of matter
My talk focuses on two so-called “geometrical arguments”, presented by Bacon in the context of his diatribe against the theory of the unity of matter. Bacon considered this theory a grave mistake since if all matter in the universe were the same, its potency would be infinite. Infinite potency, according to Bacon, means infinite essence, which can only be attributed to God. I argue that these arguments are an expression of Bacon’s “mathematical epistemology” – which was one of the keys of his enterprise to reform Latin studies. Bacon endorsed mathematics not as a science, but as a methodology by which all branches of knowledge can be unified and made immune to error. He envisioned an all-encompassing mathematics that was to transcend the disciplinary boundaries of the quadrivium and constitute the foundation for science and theology. In his “geometrical arguments”, Bacon applied that very mathematical method to metaphysics, introducing features of geometrical reasoning into propositional demonstrations. These demonstrations bring to the fore the relations between pivotal concepts of medieval Aristotelian ontology, such as essence, form, substance, and potency. Bacon showed that the assumption of an infinite potency inhering in a finite substance leads to the absurdity of the part being greater than the whole and the finite possessing more essence than the infinite. He compared magnitudes of potencies, essences, and substances, which amounts to an attempt to quantify the qualitative Aristotelian concepts.
Nicola Polloni
Epistemic Trust, Testimony, and Bogus Evidence: The Strange Case of Roger Bacon
Few names are as renowned and exemplary in medieval science as Roger Bacon’s. There seem to be numerous reasons for such consideration. His fascination with the mathematisation of various disciplinary domains, ranging from optics to natural philosophy and metaphysics, may be seen as a precursor to later tendencies towards the quantification of nature. His emphasis on the benefits humans can derive from ‘experimental science’ may appear as a prelude to the recognition of empirical procedures in scientific practices. And his vigorous critique of the scholastic method resonates with the early modern rejection of Aristotelianism. Yet scratching below the surface of these apparent similarities with later scientific developments reveals a different situation, as recent studies have emphasised. My talk focuses on the epistemological foundations of Bacon’s attitude towards science, broadly conceived. Three aspects of Bacon’s epistemology appear particularly significant in understanding the nuances of his approach: the epistemic trusthe places in his ‘peers’ and their works, his engagement with second-hand testimony of processes and practices, and the use of experiential evidence to substantiate his theories. By considering a set of peculiar cases, I will shed light on the loose structure of Bacon’s approach to science and some external factors that, although extending beyond the scientific considerations of disciplines, objects, and results, shape his attitude. A reconstruction of Bacon’s stances on epistemic trust, testimony, and evidence will provide further insights into his perspectives on science and its practices.
Sylvain Roudaut
From the ʿilm al-athqāl to the scientia de ponderibus: The challenge of integrating statics in the ‘Aristotelian’ tradition
This presentation will address the problem of integrating the science of weights into medieval science, focusing on key figures who dealt with the issue in both the Arabic tradition and the subsequent Latin thought that inherited these reflections. The aim is to highlight the methodological challenges associated with integrating a discipline defined as a science but whose exact characterization is problematic, into an Aristotelian theory of science with which it does not easily harmonize. The first part of the presentation will examine how this problem was addressed in the Arabic tradition and the position of this discipline in the classification of sciences by al-Fārābī, who, by differentiating between types of premises used in demonstrations, characterizes the science of weights (ʿilm al-athqāl) as a separate discipline from the science of machines (‘ilm al-ḥiyal). The second part will demonstrate how the transmission of this characterization of the science of weights to the Latin world generated significant difficulties in integrating it into the Aristotelian model of demonstrative science. The Archimedean-inspired methods that underpin the science of weights do not entirely correspond – and even oppose in certain respects – to this Aristotelian model. I will illustrate how, despite the elegant attempt by Jordanus of Nemore in the 13th century to integrate the methods of this discipline into an Aristotelian conceptual framework, the science of weights inherited by Latin natural philosophers relies on axioms that violate certain central tenets of Aristotelian physics. I will use the example of the philosopher Blasius of Parma (late 14th century) to highlight the contradictions between Aristotelian and Archimedean models of science that the science of weights faced in the Middle Ages.
H Darrel Rutkin
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s (1463-94) Turn to Aristotle: Reforming Celestial Influences and the Rejection of Astrology
It is well known that Giovanni Pico della Mirandola [1] turned from Platonism to Aristotle and [2] attacked astrology vehemently and from many different perspectives towards the end of his short but dramatic life. In this talk, I will explore how Pico used a more integral form of Aristotelian natural philosophy in his Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem (composed in 1493-’94, published posthumously in 1496) in order to undermine astrology’s traditional medieval scientific foundations. These were articulated in detail in what I have come to call an astrologizing Aristotelian system of natural knowledge that had been constructed in the mid 13th century and was still alive and well in Pico’s time at the end of the 15th century. In Florence then, Marsilio Ficino, Angelo Poliziano and Girolamo Savonarola all influenced Pico directly and profoundly in his endeavors, albeit in very different ways. In this heated and heady context, local cultural and broader socio-epistemic factors were woven together to create an extraordinary moment in intellectual and cultural history that we normally and rightly call the Florentine Renaissance at the absolute pinnacle of its late-15th-century flowering. Pico’s intensive attack on astrology was a significant expression of these multifold dynamics, some of which I will explore in this talk.
Craig Martin
Experience and Habitus in Giambattista Da Monte’s Commentary on the Hippocratic Epidemics I
Since the eighteenth century, scholars and physicians have celebrated the Hippocratic Epidemics, especially books one and three,as a model for observational medical practices. Recent studies have argued that sixteenth-century evaluations of the case studies in Epidemics I and III helped fuel the emergence of a new empirical culture. In the earliest printed commentary on Epidemics I (1554), Giambattista Da Monte, a professor of medicine at Padua, emphasized theoretical rules about prognostics, causation, and the importance of philosophy. Da Monte recognized the epistemological importance of experience, yet he understood it to be subordinated to theory. Rather than viewing Epidemics I and its case studies as a catalogue of raw observations that could form the foundation for new theories, he argued that the descriptions of symptoms and seasonal conditions were designed as exercises for teaching how to conjecture about diagnosis and therapy using already discovered principles. Above all he interpreted Epidemics I as a pedagogical text, and his commentary reveals that he saw theoretical knowledge as primary to observation. He believed medical education’s goal was to form the intellectual habits that promoted a reasoned understanding of the visible signs presented by patients and their surrounding conditions. For Da Monte, the methodology of the Epidemics was a means to extend theory to individual cases and annual constitutions and to confirm the underlying theoretical suppositions.
